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THE DEMANDING FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF NOT-FOR-
PROFIT DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
INTRODUCTION 
by 
Richard J. Kraus* 
Roy J. Girasa** 
The presidents and boards of United Way1 and Adelphi 
Universitl acted in manners which indicated that they either 
did not care or did not know the fiduciary standards which they 
needed to exercise. President William Aramony of the United 
Way of America spent the time of his tenure from 1970 
through 1992 at this not-for-profit enterprise using its funds 
and resources in many cases for his own personal benefit. He 
appointed board members who were his friends, rewarded 
family members with jobs, rented limousines, took transatlantic 
flights and awarded contracts with scant thought of benefit to 
United Way. Adelphi University's president, Peter 
Diamandopoulos, in like manner, ruled the governing board of 
this not-for-profit entity during his tenure from 1985 through 
1995. He misappropriated funds and lavished expenditures 
upon himself. 
*Professor of Law and Program Chair, Department of Legal 
Studies and Taxation, Lubin School of Business, Pace 
University, New York 
**Professor of Law, Department of Legal Studies and 
Taxation, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, New 
York. 
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Oftentimes the officers and boards of not-for-profit 
corporations 'believe that the standards of 
required of them do not exact the same standards reqmred of 
for-profit corporations. This paper emphasizes the fact the 
not-for-profit corporation statutes of many states reqmre the 
same standards of care, loyalty and obedience to law 
of the officers and boards of for-profit corporations. The 
legislation of many states, in fact, repeats the same words in 
each statute, whether applicable to not-for-profit or for-profit 
. . 4 enttttes. 
THE DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH, DILIGENCE, CARE AND 
SKILL 
General Duties 
Every officer and director of a not-for-profit 
must exercise the good faith, diligence, care and sk1ll reqmred 
of any ordinarily prudent person in like position under similar 
circumstances. The officer and director must actively 
participate in organizational meetings, evaluate reports, read 
minutes and review the work of those for whom they are 
responsible. 5 
Protection of the Business Judgment Rule 
Officers and directors of for-profit entities may rely upon 
the expertise of others to make a reasoned, good 
faith uninterested and informed business judgment. Th1s same 
standard of care applies to officers and directors of not-for-
profit entities. 
The officers and directors protect themselves through the 
exercise of the business judgment rule by practicing restraint 
and being diligent in avoiding hasty decisions. They 
question and probe the information obtained from experts m 
order to assure themselves the presentations made to officers 
and board are accurate and sufficiently researched. This 
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deliberation will evidence the good faith and reasonableness of 
the officer and board decision. The minutes will accurately 
describe the record of the decisional process indicating the 
fairness of consideration paid and future effects of the decision 
upon the enhancement of the corporation.6 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, for example, upheld the 
use and protection of the business judgment rule in Janssen v. 
Best & Flanagan, decided on May 22, 2003.7 George Janssen 
and others, members of the Minneapolis Police Relief 
Association (MPRA), brought a derivative action on behalf of 
the MPRA against the attorneys for the corporation, Best & 
Flanagan. The plaintiffs alleged that the corporation' s 
attorneys committed malpractice by improvidently and 
improperly counseling MPRA to invest in a company known as 
Technimar. The venture lost approximately $15 million for 
MPRA. 
MPRA was a not-for-profit corporation that administered a 
Minneapolis police officer's pension plan. It was subject to the 
Minnesota Non-profit Corporation Act and was governed by a 
board of directors. Janssen and the other plaintiffs needed 
MPRA to join in the suit, but special counsel hired by MPRA 
to investigate Janssen's claims determined that the association 
should not join the suit. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court decided that the special 
counsel could certainly act as a special litigation committee of 
the association. The directors could reasonably rely upon that 
special counsel's decision that the attorneys for the board has 
not committed malpractice and that the board should not vote 
to join the association in the suit. But the Court decided that 
the directors did not reasonably act in reliance upon the special 
counsel's decision. That counsel, Robert A. Murnane, had 
never interviewed the plaintiffs or their attorneys, which he 
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should have done as a fundamental obligation in reaching a 
prudent decision about the reasonableness of their complaints. 
Murnane also gave no indication that he had 
undertaken the careful consideration of all the germane 
benefits and detriments to MPRA that is indicative of a 
good faith business decision. Murnane opined that 
'the totality of the materials reviewed does not support 
a finding that Best & Flanagan committed legal 
malpractice in its handling of the MPRA affairs,' and 
that ' to spend money in the pursuit of a legal 
malpractice claim against Best & Flanagan would not 
be prudent use of the MPRA funds.' The language of 
his conclusion hints that his decision was that of a 
special counsel evaluating the likelihood of a legal 
victory. But a much more comprehensive weighing 
and balancing of factors is expected in situations like 
this, taking into consideration how joining or quashing 
the lawsuit could affect MPRA 's economic health, 
relations between the board of directors and members, 
MPRA's public relations, and other factors common to 
reasoned business decisions.8 
The Court, therefore, held the directors liable for their 
failure of diligence, care, and skill. 
Directors' Duties to Participate Actively in Board Action 
Directors must also actively participate in assigned board 
and committee obligations, indicate written dissent from any 
board actions, have general knowledge of the books and 
records of the corporation and investigate reports or warnings 
of employee malfeasance. 
Directors, in like manner, should ascertain the clear stated 
process for fundraising, the payment of professional fees and 
compensation and review for officers and employees. They 
must examine the monthly financial accounts and reports made 
available to board committees such as finance and audit. The 
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directors must compare actual expenditures to budgetary 
allocations, requiring an explanation of any discrepancies. 
They need to actively participate in risk assessment and 
strategic planning in order to initiate safeguards and controls 
through insurance and fidelity bonds. It is vitally important 
that the directors secure background checks for prospective 
employees, retain corporate records and protect 
whistleblowers. Equal opportunity for service should appear 
not only in the board but also in hiring practices. 
An Egregious Failure to Actively and Diligently Participate in 
Board Actions: A 2005 decision of the Commonwealth Court 
of Pennsylvania, illustrates a failure of directors ' duties to 
actively and diligently participate in board deliberations, 
particularly concerning matters of discriminatory practices in 
employee relations. 
In Spanish Council of York, Inc. d/b/a York Spanish 
American Center v. Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission9, the York Spanish American Center (Center) 
Executive Director, Vilma Garcia-Jones, began her duties in 
1992 and served with its Assistant Director, Sterling Feeser, 
until their discharge in 1996. Feeser was responsible for 
supervising the Center program's effectiveness. He managed 
staff and assisted in fundraising. He sent a letter to staff noting 
certain performance shortcomings and suggested 
improvements; the letter did not identify specific employees, 
but a month later, he sent a warning letter to one of the 
employees for failure to manage her monthly hourly quota of 
cases as required by the Center's contract with York County. 
This employee complained about the letter to her brother-in-
law, a member of the Center's board of directors. The 
Executive Director also received complaints about Feeser's 
strictness but she dismissed them, after investigation, as 
lacking merit. 
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Center board members then began to act individually and as 
a group to hear complaints about management s1?'le 
without including either Assistant Director Feeser Exe.cutlve 
Director Garcia-Jones in the meetings. The Executive Dtrector 
informed board members that these meetings were not in 
accord with specific Center grievance procedures for employee 
complaints. Board members nonetheless to hear the 
complaints without informing Feeser of the situatiOn. 
At an April 2, 1996 meeting of the board, the minutes 
recorded a concern that Feeser "was not the best person to act 
as director of the Center in the event of a vacancy in that 
position."10 Garcia-Jones, present at the meeting, indicated 
that the board was violating the Center's employee handbook 
by permitting individual meetings between and board 
members. She was "shouted down" when she mformed the 
board that references to Feeser's ethnicity were inappropriate. 
Although Feeser was fluent in Spanish and married to an 
Hispanic woman, several board members suggested that 
be eliminated because he was white. After the board meetmg, 
staff members began using racial epithets toward Feeser; one 
board member stated "he is not Latino, he is only married to a 
L · ,11 atmo. 
On April 23, 1996, the board called a special meeting. A 
consultant, Dr. Jake Keller, was asked to evaluate the 
relationships between board, administration and staff. The 
report did not recommend discharging Mr: but merely 
suggested a new grant writer position. (This position, however, 
was never advertised or filled.) The board, at the same 
meeting, voted to eliminate Feeser's position and the board 
president stated, "I needed to send a message to the staff that 
[the board] had heard their complaints and had acted upon 
them."12 Feeser's position was eliminated effective June 
1996. Garcia-Jones objected to the process and warned of Its 
impropriety, both in accordance with the procedures in the 
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employee handbook and in accord with the provisions of the 
state's Human Rights law forbidding discrimination based on 
race. 
In September 1996, Feeser filed a complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission; eight days after the 
complaint was served, the Center's board fired Garcia-Jones. 
She subsequently filed her own complaint with the 
Commission, asserting that her termination was prohibited 
retaliation. The Commonwealth Court decided that 
discriminatory practices had occurred against both Feeser and 
Garcia-Jones. The Court reasoned that board minutes, board 
members' conduct and board actions indicated a desire to 
discriminate on the basis of race and did not contain any 
consistent or reasoned statement concerning Feeser's supposed 
poor management style. Even if the Center had mixed motives, 
the motive which predominated was that of racial 
discrimination. Both Feeser and Garcia-Jones properly 
petitioned the Commission under the Act because they were (i) 
protected, (ii) qualified, (iii) suffered adverse employment 
action and (iv) were discharged in circumstances that inferred 
prohibited discrimination. 13 Failure of the Center's board and 
its members to follow basic guidelines of good faith, diligence, 
care and skill resulted in serious deleterious effects upon a not-
for-profit corporation whose laudable mission included the 
fostering of citizenship and responsibility among the members 
of the Latin-American community in York, Pennsylvania. 
Heightened Internal Controls Required: Recent statutes 
requiring additional diligence among board members and in 
board action have resulted in heightened internal control. 
Many not-for-profit corporations have prepared documents to 
comply with the oversight, internal control and code for ethics 
for financial professionals required of for-profit corporations 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 14 In order to comply with 
the Act, these not-for-profit corporations are in the process of 
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creating an active and aware audit committee. The Chief 
Financial Officer and the Executive Director will publicly 
attest to the accuracy, completeness and fairness of the 
corporation's financial statements, to publicly disclose a code 
of ethics for senior management and the governing board, to 
have all audit work proved by the board audit committee and to 
examine closely all insider loans.15 
THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
Officers and directors, if at all possible, should avoid 
conflict of interests. The not-for-profit organization, however, 
may enter a contract in which one of its directors has a material 
financial interest. The interest, however, must be fully 
disclosed to the board; the interested director must refrain from 
voting; and the transaction must be reasonable and fair on its 
face. Most boards, in fact, have instituted written policies 
concerning the avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
A not-for-profit corporation, furthermore, should refrain 
from making corporate loans to directors, officers or their 
families, even though the statutes permit such loans in the 
reasonable expectation ofbenefit to the corporation. 
Directors and officers, in like manner, should avoid 
corporate opportunities, which divert a not-for-profit entity's 
opportunities to personal gain of the director or officer. If the 
opportunity is available or suitable to the corporation, the 
officer or director may only take the opportunity if the 
corporation, after due deliberation, decides not to take the 
opportunity. 
The duty of loyalty also requires directors and officers to 
comply with the organization's articles of incorporation and 
bylaws, its mission and purpose. 
The duty of loyalty demands a curb upon self-dealing. 
Officers and directors often experience difficulty in complying 
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with this requirement. All of the cases cited above illustrate 
forms of self-dealing, especially failure to comply with the not-
for-profit organization's purpose and emoluments to directors, 
officers and their families. Additional cases caution the board 
member to exercise loyalty, honesty, and fidelity. 
In particular, Fitzgerald v. The National Rifle Association of 
America16, describes a board's attempt to retain control over 
board membership itself. The plaintiff Fitzgerald and others 
petitioned the court to obtain an order requiring the defendant 
National Rifle Association (NRA) to publish certain 
advertising in its official journal, The American Rifleman, 
concerning Fitzgerald's candidacy for the NRA's board of 
directors. The District Court issued the order. It reasoned that 
freedom of the press and the contractual statement on the 
NRA's advertising rate card did not permit it to refuse the 
advertisement because the fiduciary duty of corporate directors 
includes the duty to ensure fair and open corporate elections. 
The court indicated that this fiduciary duty extended only to 
members of the organization which would include plaintiff 
Fitzgerald. 
The NRA was organized under the laws of the state ofNew 
York pursuant to that state's not-for-profit corporation law. Its 
directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to its stockholders, 
in this case the Association's membership, to conduct its affairs 
in good faith and to promote the best interests of the 
Association. Officers and directors cannot manipulate the 
affairs a corporation in order to obtain control for themselves 
and not for another. The District Court cited Justice Douglas's 
opinion in Pepper v. Litton: 
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve 
himself first and his cestuis second. He cannot 
manipulate the affairs of his corporation to their 
detriment and in disregard of the standard of common 
decency and honesty . . . He cannot use his powers for 
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his own personal advantage and to the detriment of the 
stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in 
terms that power may be and no matter how 
meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For 
that power is at all times subject to the equitable 
limitations that it may not be exercised for the 
aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the 
fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis. 17 
THE DUTY OF OBEDIENCE 
The duty of loyalty to the organization's governing 
documents is reinforced by the directors' and officers' duty to 
obey those documents, including any corporate statement 
concerning conflict of interest and disclosure. 
Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp. 18 
reinforces the right of a not-for-profit cooperative governing 
board to use its business judgment and to comply with its 
cooperative apartment rules in order to enforce a "stop work" 
order. Tenant-shareholder Levandusky sought to install 
heating riser pipes which arguably could create problems 
elsewhere in the building's worn pipe system. The standard of 
review which the Court of Appeals applied to this enforcement 
of a building policy against a tenant-shareholder included both 
the business judgment rule, which stated that the board 
decision was reasonable in the circumstances. A concurring 
opinion additionally indicated that the decision by the board 
was certainly not arbitrary and capricious. Under both 
standards the cooperative board acted in accord with its 
governing documents. Alleged personal dislike of the tenant-
shareholder by individual board members did not affect the 
reasonableness of the decision. In the circumstances, no 
evidence was adduced that the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
65Nol.21/North East Journal of Legal Studies 
Officers and directors, additionally, should familiarize 
themselves with state and federal statutes concerning 
solicitations for the not-for-profit's charitable purposes; 
income, sales and use taxes; unemployment and worker's 
compensation duties; tax and financial reporting 
responsibilities; and not-for-profit corporation obligations in 
general to comply with statutory requirements. 
St. Bartholomew's Church v. The City of New York and the 
Landmarks Preservation Commission 19 clearly illustrates a not-
for-profit board's necessity to comply not only with its internal 
regulations but also with a local statute. The Court rejected the 
claim of St. Bartholomew's that the decision of the Landmarks 
Preservation Commission was an unconstitutional 
impingement upon the Church's First Amendment free 
exercise clause and establishment clause rights. The Court also 
indicated that the property building restriction did not 
constitute a government taking of property without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
The Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. 
Bartholomew's Church constituted its officers and directors. 
They sought to amend a previous designation of the Church 
and adjacent seven-story community house as a New York City 
landmark in accordance with the Landmarks law. The Church 
building would remain intact, but the community house would 
be replaced by a forty-seven-story tower in order to adequately 
meet the Church's purposes for its charitable programs. 
The Court, however, agreed with the denial of any change in 
status for the Church and its community house. The denial was 
not a government regulation of religious beliefs as such; the 
free exercise of religion does not relieve any individual, officer 
or board from compliance with a valid neutral law of general 
applicability. The Landmark law, furthermore, did not so 
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seriously restrict the church 's ability to use its property as to 
constitute an unjust taking which would violate the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
The officers and directors of St. Bartholomew's church, 
therefore, were compelled to comply with a valid local statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Any practitioner who advises officers and directors of not-
for-profit corporations must unequivocally state their duties to 
be careful, diligent and faithful, to be loyal, and to be obedient. 
The illustrative cases and statutes mentioned above vividly 
require these officers and directors to use skills commensurate 
with that of any ordinarily prudent person in like position under 
similar circumstances. Increasingly, these officers and 
directors will need to practice the same standards of care, 
loyalty and obedience to law required of the officers and board 
members of for-profit organizations. 
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NEW YORK'S NEW HOME EQUITY THEFT 
PREVENTION ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
by 
Dr. Alka Bramhandkar* 
Gwen Seaquist, J.D.** 
The main stream media has been heralding a crisis in the 
sub-prime mortgage sector. Newspaper and television reports 
are replete with alarming news, leading viewers to believe that 
the current crisis developed overnight. The purpose of this 
paper will be to examine how this crisis is not an over-night 
phenomenon, but the result of a series of decisions that took 
place over a decade and which arose from a variety of factors 
that some have compared to the banking problems of the 
1930's. This paper will also examine the vast repercussions 
these decisions have had on the entire U. S. economy, some of 
which are already showing in the retail sector. Finally, we will 
conclude with recent New York legislation meant to stave off 
at least a part of this crisis by enacting consumer protection 
legislation for purchasers of foreclosed properties ... 
Overview of the Fiscal Crisis 
One of the main culprits of the current financial crisis has 
been the lending financial institutions themselves. 
*Associate Professor of Finance & International Business, 
School of Business, Ithaca College, New York 
**Professor of Legal Studies, School of Business, Ithaca 
College, New York 
